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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 








ATTORNEY GENERAL  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
_______________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
BIA No. A209-346-238 
(U.S. Immigration Judge: David Cheng) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 November 10, 2020 
 
 Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENBERG*, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges. 
 







* The Honorable Morton I. Greenberg participated in the decision in this case, but died 
before the opinion could be filed. This opinion is filed by a quorum of the court. 28 
U.S.C. § 46 and Third Circuit IOP 12.1(b). 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Petitioner, Rene Lucas, appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals’s denial 
of his motion to reopen the proceedings. Lucas contends the BIA abused its discretion in 
rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The BIA found that Lucas’s claim 
was procedurally deficient because he failed to file a complaint against his former 
counsel or offer a sufficient explanation for failing to do so. We see no abuse of 
discretion.  
Lucas also contends he was denied due process because the Immigration Judge did 
not sufficiently warn him about certain consequences of a voluntary departure order. We 
hold the Immigration Judge communicated all the information required under the law. 
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
Lucas avers that he has lived in the United States since his entry in 1999. A 
Mexican citizen, he entered the United States without being admitted or inspected by an 
Immigration Officer. Since his entry, Lucas has at least four criminal convictions in the 
United States.1  
On June 6, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security issued Lucas a Notice to 
Appear in removal proceedings, charging him with being subject to removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). DHS promptly filed the Notice to Appear with the Elizabeth 
 
1In 2016, Lucas was convicted of refusal to consent to a breathalyzer test and driving 
without a license. In 2017, Lucas was convicted for driving without a license and pleaded 




Immigration Court. In response, Lucas submitted an application for cancellation of 
removal for non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Lucas’s former counsel 
subsequently advised him that his application would most likely not be approved, but that 
the court would likely grant Lucas an order of voluntary departure. Lucas voluntarily 
withdrew his cancellation of removal application, and the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
issued an order of voluntary departure on April 16, 2019, giving Lucas a four-month 
period to voluntarily depart the country. 
On July 12, 2019, Lucas filed a motion to reopen based on the alleged ineffective 
assistance of his former counsel in failing to inform him that a voluntary departure order 
would—under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II)—subject him to a ten-year re-entry bar as 
an alien who has accrued more than one year of “unlawful presence.” In support, Lucas 
filed an affidavit expressing his lack of knowledge about the ten-year re-entry bar. 
Present counsel filed an affidavit and sent a letter to former counsel requesting her 
response to Lucas’s allegation. Significantly, present counsel informed former counsel 
that “there is no intention to file a complaint with any disciplinary committee.” Former 
counsel acknowledged receipt, but the record reveals that she provided no further 
response. Lucas also alleged that former counsel engaged in ineffective assistance by 
failing to “update” the court with information regarding his son’s October 2018 
hospitalization. Additionally, Lucas alleged he was denied due process because the IJ did 
not sufficiently warn him about the ten-year re-entry bar. 
On July 16, 2019, the IJ denied the motion to reopen citing failure to comply with 
the procedural requirements of an ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim. As the 
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government points out, the IJ noted that faulting former counsel for failing to present 
evidence of Lucas’s son’s hospitalization contradicts the proceedings because Lucas 
previously “submitted a psychological report from Dr. Stephen Reich” and the merits 
hearing post-dated the October hospitalization. Lucas appealed to the BIA.2  
The BIA dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s opinion on both the 
procedural deficiencies and Lucas’s failure to present evidence of his son’s 
hospitalization. Additionally, the BIA explained, even if Lucas had met the procedural 
requirements, Lucas’s former counsel did not provide ineffective assistance and Lucas’s 
due process rights were not violated by the IJ’s failure to inform him of the ten-year re-
entry bar. This appeal followed.3 
II. 
 To successfully reopen a case based on an IAC claim, an applicant must meet 
certain procedural and substantive requirements. Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 172 
(3d Cir. 2008). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lucas failed to 
substantially comply with the procedural requirements to establish an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.4  
 
2 On appeal, Lucas added an argument that his case should be remanded so that he could 
apply for administrative closure in light of Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019). 
The BIA found that, even if it had authority to grant administrative closure, Lucas did not 
make a prima facie showing that administrative closure was warranted in this case. We 
find no abuse of discretion.  
3 We have appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C § 1252(a).  
4 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and will only 
reverse if its decision was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Filja v. Gonzales, 
447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d 




 The procedural requirements for a motion to reopen based on an IAC claim 
include, inter alia, (1) notification to former counsel—evidence that former counsel has 
been informed of the allegations and allowed to respond, together with any subsequent 
response or report of former counsel’s failure or refusal to respond; and (2) evidence that 
a complaint against former counsel has been lodged with the appropriate disciplinary 
authorities, or an explanation for why a complaint has not been filed. Matter of Lozada, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988).  
It would appear that Lucas complied with notifying former counsel, but it is clear 
that he never filed a complaint against his former counsel with the relevant jurisdiction’s 
disciplinary authorities. Accordingly, Lucas could only have met the complaint 
requirement by providing a reasonable explanation for why a complaint had not been 
filed. See Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (the complaint 
requirement is met when a petitioner provides a reasonable explanation for his failure to 
file a disciplinary complaint). An explanation is not reasonable when it fails to serve the 
purposes of the complaint requirement, which include promoting confidence in the 
validity of IAC claims and avoiding meritless claims. See In re Rivera–Claros, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 599, 605-07 (BIA 1996) (finding an explanation inadequate where it did not serve 
the purposes of the complaint requirement). 
 Lucas offers several explanations for his failure to file a complaint against his 
former counsel, none of which serve the purposes of the complaint requirement. First, he 
contends that filing a complaint would serve no purpose because the disciplinary 
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authorities are not competent to deal with his IAC claim given the specialization required 
for immigration cases and the high volume of similar complaints.5 Instead of serving the 
purposes of the complaint requirement, Lucas’s explanation subverts them. The 
complaint requirement presumes that filing a complaint with the disciplinary authorities 
is a worthwhile endeavor evidencing the validity of an IAC claim. Accordingly, Lucas’s 
explanation is insufficient.  
Lucas also contends no complaint was necessary because former counsel was 
provided detailed notice of the allegations. This explanation responds to the separate and 
distinct notification requirement, which requires evidence that former counsel has been 
informed of the allegation and allowed to respond. Fulfilling the notification requirement 
cannot in and of itself fulfill the complaint requirement.6  
Finally, Lucas suggests that the complaint requirement is excused because former 
counsel did not respond to Lucas’s notification of the allegations. This explanation fails 
to provide any indication of the claim’s validity and does not serve the purposes of the 
complaint requirement. Moreover, it is undermined by Lucas’ statement, in the 
notification to former counsel, that he had “no intention to file a complaint with any 
disciplinary committee.” We find the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining 
Lucas failed to meet the complaint requirement, and, accordingly, failed to meet the 
 
5 On appeal to the BIA, Lucas claimed for the first time that the filing of a bar complaint 
would “serve[] no purpose in such an arcane subject as Immigration, especially where 
issues of due process are concerned.” 
6 In addition, this explanation may be disregarded because it was not presented before the 
BIA, where Lucas only argued that filing a complaint would “serve no purpose.” A 
petitioner may only obtain judicial review “if he or she raises all issues before the BIA.” 
Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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procedural requirements for a motion to reopen based on an IAC claim. For this reason 
alone, Lucas cannot prevail on his motion to reopen.  
B. 
Assuming Lucas could meet the procedural requirements, he cannot establish that 
his former counsel engaged in ineffective assistance. Lucas claims his former counsel 
erred in failing to advise him that a voluntary departure order would result in a ten-year 
re-entry bar from entering the United States. Moreover, Lucas contends the BIA abused 
its discretion in finding that he did not establish his former counsel engaged in ineffective 
assistance.  
We analyze Lucas’s substantive IAC claims under “a two-part test to assess error 
and prejudice, asking ‘(1) whether competent counsel would have acted otherwise, and, if 
yes, (2) whether the alien was prejudiced.’” Rranci, 540 F.3d at 175 (quoting Fadiga v. 
Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 157 (3d Cir. 2007)). An alien is prejudiced when there is a 
reasonable likelihood the result would have been different if counsel’s errors had not 
occurred. Fadiga, 488 F.3d. at 159. We find the BIA did not abuse its discretion because 
Lucas was not prejudiced by former counsel’s advice.  
By accepting counsel’s advice to seek an order of voluntary departure, Lucas 
remained subject to a ten-year re-entry bar attached to “unlawful presence” because he is 
an alien who has accrued more than one year of “unlawful presence.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). Lucas argues that competent counsel would have advised him of 
this ten-year re-entry bar. But even if competent counsel would have advised him of the 
ten-year re-entry bar, Lucas was not prejudiced because it is not reasonably likely that the 
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result would have been different.  
Here, the BIA reasonably concluded that, even if Lucas had “substantially 
complied with the procedural requirements” for this claim, “he did not establish that his 
prior counsel actually engaged in ineffective assistance rather than making a tactical 
decision by withdrawing the respondent’s cancellation of removal application and instead 
seeking voluntary departure.” Lucas fails to recognize the relative weakness of his claim 
for cancellation of removal. To succeed, Lucas would have had to demonstrate, inter alia, 
his “removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a member 
of his family who is also a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C § 
1229b(b)(1)(D).  
The “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement presents a major 
hurdle. Though Lucas has a child who is a U.S. citizen with a learning disability and 
documented emotional problems that have led to hospitalization, that alone would likely 
be insufficient to meet the high “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” burden. 8 
U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1); see In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 469-70 (BIA 
2002) (finding a mother and sole provider for six children was barely within “the narrow 
spectrum of cases” in which this requirement is met). Here, Lucas is not the sole provider 
for his children and has already lived separately from his children, who live with their 
mother full time. Furthermore, the BIA and the IJ considered evidence Lucas had 
submitted regarding his son’s hospitalization.7 
 
7 Lucas also appears to claim that his prior counsel acted ineffectively by failing to both 
obtain through questioning and make use of information about Lucas’s son’s October 
2018 hospitalization. But former counsel never received this information from Lucas 
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Failure to meet the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” would have 
necessarily led to Lucas’s application for cancellation of removal being rejected. Had that 
occurred, he would have faced forced removal or voluntary departure—in either case, he 
would have been subject to a ten-year admissibility bar. Accordingly, we cannot say that 
it is reasonably likely that Lucas would have avoided a ten-year admissibility bar had 
former counsel not made the alleged error.  
For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion 
that Lucas did not establish former counsel engaged in ineffective assistance. But, as 
noted, our judgment rests on Lucas’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements 
for an IAC claim.  
III. 
Lucas contends the IJ violated his right to due process by not informing him that 
withdrawal of the application in exchange for a voluntary departure order would still 
leave him subject to a ten-year admissibility bar.8 We disagree.  
 
because Lucas did not deem it relevant. Furthermore, additional information regarding 
Lucas’s son’s mental health does not change our prejudice analysis. As the government 
points out, the IJ noted that faulting prior counsel for failing to present evidence of the 
hospitalization contradicts the proceedings because Lucas previously “submitted a 
psychological report from Dr. Stephen Reich” regarding Lucas’s son’s mental health 
issues. See also App. at 5 (BIA noting that “[Lucas’s] lack of knowledge about the 
relevance of [the hospitalization evidence] of his son’s mental health [was] insufficient to 
render this evidence previously unavailable, especially since [Lucas] submitted [other] 
evidence regarding his son’s hardship before his merits hearing.”). 
8 Due process requires that aliens threatened with removal are provided a full and fair 
hearing with a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence on their behalf. 
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 596 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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An IJ is required to advise the subject of removal proceedings about certain 
specified matters, see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a), but is not required to explain that a 
voluntary departure order may lead to a ten-year re-entry bar based on “unlawful 
presence.” The voluntary departure statute states that “[t]he order permitting an alien to 
depart voluntarily shall inform the alien of the penalties” for failing to depart as required. 
8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(3). The appropriate penalties were laid out in the IJ’s order granting 
voluntary departure. Accordingly, we find no violation of Lucas’s due process rights. 
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review. 
